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Trade openness can affect welfare through changes in workers’ skill acquisition.
We develop a multisector Eaton–Kortum model, in which skill intensities and on-the-
job learning opportunities are heterogeneous across sectors. Workers decide whether
to become skilled before entering the labor market, and accumulate human capital on
the job. Through the lens of our model, trade-induced sector reallocation changes the
returns of becoming skilled and on-the-job learning opportunities. Our model allows
for an analytical formula of the gains from trade. This formula is an augmented ver-
sion of the ACR formula and includes gains due to changes in skill acquisition. Our
calibrated model suggests that the gains from trade due to changes in skill acquisition
are vastly different across countries and may be negative, with sizable gains for the
United States, the United Kingdom, and India, as well as considerable losses for Ger-
many, Brazil, and Argentina.
JEL Codes: F1; J2. Key Words: international trade; sector reallocation; gains from
trade; skill acquisition; human capital; college education; on-the-job learning.
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Trade openness can affect welfare through changes in workers’ skill acquisition. By shift-
ing economic activities across sectors, firms, or occupations, freer trade alters returns and
opportunities for schooling and on-the-job learning. For instance, Atkin (2016) finds that
growth of manufacturing exports led to more high-school dropouts in Mexico, whereas
Ferriere, Navarro and Reyes-Heroles (2019) show that greater exposure to the “China
Trade Shock” encouraged college enrollment in the United States.1 These studies are rich
in empirical analysis, mostly focusing on specific countries, however little quantitative
evidence describes how educational choice affects welfare gains from trade across a large
set of countries. Moreover, the role of on-the-job learning—which is important in foster-
ing human capital (Manuelli and Seshadri 2014) and vastly different across sectors (Islam,
Jedwab, Romer and Pereira 2018)—is understudied in the trade literature.
In this paper, we study how trade affects welfare by changing workers’ education choices
and on-the-job learning opportunities. We develop a multisector Eaton–Kortum model
with heterogeneous skill intensities and on-the-job learning opportunities across sectors.
On the worker side, we embed an OLG model, in which workers first choose whether
to become skilled before entering the labor market and then accumulate human capital
on the job. Through the lens of the model, trade-induced sector reallocation changes the
demand for skills, as well as on-the-job learning opportunities for workers. This model
yields the same gravity equation as in Eaton and Kortum (2002). Most notably, this model
allows for an analytical solution to the gains from trade, measured by changes in real con-
sumption from autarky to the observed economy. Our formula incorporates Arkolakis,
Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2012) (ACR) formula, augmented by gains due to changes
in skill acquisition.
We combine multiple data sources to calibrate the model to 53 countries and the Rest of
the World in 2005, with 20 sectors. We show that the gains from trade due to skill acquisi-
tion are vastly different across countries and are possibly negative. The United States, the
United Kingdom, and India gain the most from trade-induced shifts in skill acquisition,
with a 0.5%, 0.88%, and 0.49% increase in real consumption, largely because of their com-
parative advantage in services that require more skills and entail faster on-the-job learn-
ing than manufacturing and agriculture. In contrast, the biggest losses from trade due to
skill acquisition occur in Germany, Brazil, and Argentina, with a 0.74%, 0.68%, and 0.77%
1Also see Blanchard and Olney (2016), Li (2018), among others.
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reduction in real consumption, as they specialize in manufacturing sectors or agriculture
after trade openness. Finally, quantitative results suggest that developed countries enjoy
better on-the-job learning opportunities after trade openness.
We then provide supportive evidence of how exporting may alter on-the-job learning op-
portunities. Across broad sectors (agriculture, industry, services), poor countries tend
to shift employment toward sectors with higher on-the-job learning opportunities by ex-
porting. However, in detailed manufacturing sectors, rich countries specialize in man-
ufacturing sectors with faster on-the-job learning by exporting, which is consistent with
our quantitative findings.
With this study, we contribute by providing a tractable framework that incorporates the
gains due to changes in skill acquisition to the ACR formula. Two channels are central to
the skill acquisition term: the change in skill acquisition through educational choices and
on-the-job learning. We are not the first to examine the relationship between trade and
schooling decisions. However, we contribute to the literature by incorporating on-the-job
learning as a new channel generating dynamic effects of trade, which is driven by labor
reallocation between industries with different learning opportunities.
This paper relates to several strands of the literature. The first strand is the vast litera-
ture on the gains from trade. Extant studies emphasize the importance of several factors
in accounting for the gains from trade, such as multiple industries, intermediate inputs,
firm entry, nonlinearities, and productivity correlations (see e.g., Costinot and Rodríguez-
Clare 2014, Caliendo and Parro 2015, Adão, Costinot and Donaldson 2017, Lind and Ra-
mondo 2017, Baqaee and Farhi 2019). Complementing these earlier contributions, we
explore the effect of two other factors—education choices and on-the-job learning—on
the gains from trade. We show how the ACR formula is modified to account for these
two factors. Moreover, workers’ on-the-job learning provides an extra channel through
which trade can affect wage returns, in addition to firm revenues commonly studied in
the literature (e.g., Helpman, Itskhoki, Muendler and Redding 2017, Fajgelbaum 2019).
Second, we naturally relate to the literature on skill acquisition and trade. In addition
to Atkin (2016) and Ferriere et al. (2019), many empirical studies also find that trade af-
fects schooling. Blanchard and Olney (2016) show that growth in skill-intensive exports
increases schooling using a panel of 102 countries and 45 years, and Li (2018) documents
similar evidence for China. In the quantitative strand of the literature, some papers study
the effects of trade on schooling decisions starting with Findlay and Kierzkowski (1983)
who first incorporates education choices into the two-factor, two-good trade model. After
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this early work, some work has been devoted to quantify the dynamics effects of trade on
schooling decisions and, in some cases, to characterize the transition paths of wages and
skill premia (e.g., Falvey, Greenaway and Silva 2010, Harris and Robertson 2013, Danziger
2017). These papers on trade and schooling decisions mostly study the skill premium, but
they do not consider on-the-job human capital accumulation. We complement these stud-
ies by investigating the understudied relationship between on-the-job learning and trade.
We also fill the gap in the literature by implementing quantitative analysis on how trade
affects welfare across a large set of countries through schooling choices and on-the-job
learning.
Finally, we make contact with recent papers that highlight the importance of life-cycle hu-
man capital accumulation in accounting for cross-country income differences. Manuelli
and Seshadri (2014) finds that on-the-job training accounts for almost half of human capi-
tal differences across countries, which implies a large role of on-the-job learning in deter-
mining the gains from trade. Our results imply that trade liberalization has differential
impacts on on-the-job learning in developing and developed economies and may even
widen the income gap.
This paper is organized as follows. Section II develops the model. Section III provides the
model calibration and quantitative results on the gains from trade. Section IV includes
some model extensions and discussions. Section V documents suggestive evidence on
exports and on-the-job learning. Section VI concludes.
II Model
This section develops a model to understand how trade affects welfare through changes
in skill acquisition. The production side rests on a multisector Eaton–Kortum model with
sector-specific skill intensities and on-the-job learning opportunities. On the worker side,
we embed a two-period OLG model. Each worker decides whether to become skilled
before entering the economy, then looks for jobs by random search, and works for two
periods. Workers accumulate human capital on the job.
II.A Production
The world contains I countries and S industries, and we index country by i and sector by




is , where βis
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is the expenditure share on intermediate goods from sector s with
∑
s βis = 1. Denote Pi
















where pjis(ω) is the selling price from country j to i. Denote the intermediate-good price







Every country i has the technology to produce each variety ω of sector s, with the pro-
ductivity level z drawn from a Fréchet distribution Fis(z) = exp(−Aisz
−ϑs). The scale
parameter Ais governs the average productivity and thus comparative advantage of sec-
tor s in country i. The shape parameter ϑs governs the dispersion of productivity draws,











where l and h represent efficiency units of time for unskilled and skilled workers. The
parameter αs characterizes the skill intensity of sector s’s production. The parameter ψi
captures skilled-biased technology in production for country i. The parameter φ is the
elasticity of substitution between two types of labor. This production technology is freely
available to a large number of potential entrants that take prices as given. Moreover,
shipping one unit of goods from country i to j incurs iceberg costs dijs ≥ 1.
II.B Workers
In country i, there is a measure Ni of workers in each generation. Workers in each gen-
eration decide whether to become skilled in the pre-period, and then work and consume
for two periods. We solve the workers’ choices by backward induction. After deter-
mining whether to become skilled, a young worker enters the labor market, searches for
a job, and obtains utility from consuming final goods, according to the utility function
U(c) = log(cY ) + 1
1+ρ
log(cO). Working in sector s for one period generates a τhis and τ
l
is in-
crease in the next-period’s human capital for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively.
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The budget constraint for a young worker who finds a job in sector s is:
wmi +







, m ∈ {h, l} (4)
where ri is the interest rate, and m denotes workers’ type (skilled or unskilled). w
m
i is the
type-specific and country-specific wage rate per efficiency unit of labor. We will describe





)) as the expected utility from consumption before entering the labor
market, for unskilled (skilled) workers. In the pre-period, each worker chooses to become







) + log(ǫl) if choosing to be unskilled
EU(ch
i
) + log(ǫh) + log(1− ei) if choosing to be skilled
where {ǫh, ǫl} are idiosyncratic preferences on becoming a skilled or unskilled worker
respectively, which are i.i.d. and drawn from a Fréchet distribution G(ǫ) = exp(−ǫ−κ).
For example, log(ǫh) < 0 may capture that for some workers, learning requires more
efforts and generates higher disutility. The parameter ei characterizes the time spent for
becoming skilled in the pre-period, following Hsieh, Hurst, Jones and Klenow (2019).
Thus, in Appendix A.1, we show that the share of workers who decide to become skilled








))(1− ei)κ + exp(κEU(cli))
(5)
Define Hi = Λ
h
iNi and Li = Λ
l
iNi as the efficiency units of skilled and unskilled young
workers, respectively. The parameter κ determines the magnitude of the response of
education choices to changes in wage returns, which will be disciplined by reduced-form
evidence in the next section.
Recent theory papers by Monge-Naranjo (2016) and Buera and Oberfield (2020) suggest
that trade openness can change learning opportunities {τ lis, τ
h
is} through cross-country
knowledge diffusion. However, there is still limited empirical evidence on their mech-
anisms. Therefore, we focus on the role of trade-induced sector reallocation in shaping
on-the-job learning opportunities and assume that sector-specific learning opportunities
{τ lis, τ
h
is} are unaffected by trade openness. In Appendix B.1, we show that in a Ben–Porath
model in which on-the-job learning requires time and the available knowledge remains
constant, sector-specific on-the-job learning is unaffected by trade because marginal re-
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turns and marginal costs of learning change by the same proportion after trade openness.
II.C Labor Market
Following Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) and Pissarides (2000), we assume that work-
ers meet firms by random search. Skilled and unskilled workers search in separate mar-
kets. Firms post vacancies to hire unskilled and skilled workers, which cost f l and fh
units of final goods respectively.
We make several simplifying assumptions on labor market dynamics to ease aggregation,
and we relax these assumptions in our robustness check in Section IV. There is one na-
tional labor market for each type of worker. The amount of vacancies for each type of
worker is aggregated across all firms and sectors. We abstract from job destruction, and
therefore all searchers are young workers. We also abstract from unemployment by as-
suming that the matching function is M(U, V ) = min{U, V }, and that vacancy posting






the market tightness for skilled and unskilled workers, where V hi and V
l
i are
the total number of vacancies for recruiting skilled and unskilled workers, respectively.
After searching and matching, workers and firms engage in wage bargaining as in Stole
and Zwiebel (1996),2 and workers capture a portion 0 < β < 1 of the marginal output.
II.D Trade Shares
Taking market prices as given, a firm producing variety ω chooses vacancies vhi and v
l
i
to maximize profits for different markets. Under perfect competition, foreign prices are
proportional to domestic prices pijs(ω) = dijspiis(ω) by the same proportion as losses in
output due to iceberg costs. For analytical tractability, we assume that firms are my-
opic in the sense that they only maximize one period profits when posting vacancies and
therefore ignore future profits from hiring young workers (when they turn old). This as-



























+ (1 + τhis)h
O
2This way of modelling the wage bargaining is widely used (see e.g., Helpman et al. 2017).
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where (1 + τ lis)l
O and (1 + τhis)h
O denote the efficiency units of unskilled and skilled old






specify the amount of
new hires from posted vacancies for skilled and unskilled workers, respectively. Firms
spend profits from hiring the remaining old workers on final goods.
In the equilibrium, free entry of vacancies implies that:

























The left-hand side is the average vacancy costs to hire one unit of labor, whereas the right-
hand side is the one period profit from hiring that worker. By using the assumption that
workers capture a portion 0 < β < 1 of the marginal output and equation (6), we obtain































Wages are constant across firms within a country due to free entry. Define wis as labor


















We solve for the share of country j’s expenses in sector s that source from country i








Therefore, the model predicts identical trade shares as in multisector Eaton–Kortum mod-
els (e.g., Burstein and Vogel 2017). Production costs are sector-specific, because different
sectors have different skill intensities in production.

















We assume that trade is balanced at the national level for each period. Also, we denote
Λhis (Λ
l
is) as the ratio of employment of skilled (unskilled) workers in sector s to total





































































where the left-hand side is the supply of each type of worker to each sector, and the right-
hand side is the demand for each type of worker, aggregated over destinations. Note




i}i. Therefore, combining equations








is = 1, we can solve for each coun-
try’s wages {whi , w
l




is} and the share of skilled
workers Λhi = 1 − Λ
l
i. With wages and the measure of workers, we can solve all other
endogenous variables {θli, θ
h
i , Pis, Pi, pijs(ω),Πijs}. The interest rate ri is determined such
that the aggregate saving is zero for each country in each period.
II.F Gains from Trade
We follow Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) to measure welfare by workers’ real con-
sumption. For country i, denote GTi as the ratio of real consumption in the observed
economy to that in the autarkic economy in which bilateral trade costs are infinite dijs →
∞ ∀ i 6= j. We use superscript o for variables in the autarkic economy.
Proposition 1 (Gains from Trade). Assume that trade is balanced at the national level. The























































,m ∈ {h, l} measures the effect of relative wages on the aggregate price.
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Proof: See Appendix A.3.
The first term on the right-hand side is exactly the multisector version of the formula in
ACR, which reflects gains due to changes in wages and prices after trade openness.
The key contribution of this paper is the second term that captures gains from trade due to
changes in skill acquisition and involves three forces. First, trade openness alters the skill
premium, which affects the relative ratio of wages to prices faced by different workers,
as shown by λmi ,m ∈ {h, l}. Second, trade openness changes the measure of unskilled
and skilled workers through education choices in equation (5). This force is reflected by
changes in the number of skilled and unskilled workers Hi and Li. Third, trade openness
also affects on-the-job learning, by shifting employment (Λlis and Λ
h
is) across sectors with
different learning opportunities (τ lis and τ
h
is) for each type of worker.
If there is only one type of worker, i.e. αs = 1 ∀ s or αs = 0 ∀ s, then the formula in

















Gains due to on-the-job learning
(14)
This simplified formula is intuitive: it captures changes in employment-weighted on-the-
job human capital accumulation. As a result, shifting employment to a sector with more
learning opportunities (higher τis) can lead to larger gains from trade.
For analytical tractability, we abstracted from job turnover and workers’ and firms’ inter-
nalization of benefits from on-the-job learning. In Section IV, we study a realistic exten-
sion of our model with rich labor market dynamics, in which workers search for jobs and
firms post vacancies by considering sector-specific learning opportunities. We will show
that this extended model leads to similar quantitative results as our baseline model.
III Quantitative Analysis
We first show how we calibrate the model to the data. After that, we present quantitative




We extend the model to incorporate intermediate inputs because input–output linkages
are important in understanding the gains from trade (e.g., Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare














is , where ms′ represents expenses on in-
termediate inputs from sector s′. The parameter γs
′
is represents the share of production
costs in industry s that are spent on materials from sector s′, and the parameter γlis is the
share of costs spent on labor. In Appendix A.4, we extend the formula for the gains from
trade in Proposition 1 to account for the input–output linkages.
We calibrate our model to 53 countries and the Rest of the World in 2005.4 We consider 20
sectors—agriculture, mining, 16 manufacturing sectors, low-skill services, and high-skill
services. Appendix C provides the details of countries and sector decomposition.








is, αs, ψi, ei, Ais, κ} to solve
the model, and we present those values in Table 1. We set ρ = (1 + 0.04)20 − 1, as we con-
sider 20 years to be one period with an annualized discount rate of 4%. We set the labor
share to be β = 2/3 according to estimates in Gollin (2002), and the elasticity of substitu-
tion between skilled and unskilled labor to be φ = 1.5, as commonly found in the labor




m ∈ {l, h},
and vacancy costs fm cannot be separated from market tightness θmi without information
on each country’s labor market tightness. Because the separation of fm from θmi does not
affect equilibrium production and trade flows, we normalize fm = 0.1m ∈ {l, h}.5
We use sector-specific trade elasticities ϑs from Caliendo and Parro (2015).
6 We obtain
employment Ni for each country in 2005 from the World Bank. We follow Head and
Ries (2001) to assume symmetric trade costs dijs = djis and infer them from actual trade
4We consider the following 53 countries in the calibration: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bulgaria,
Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Cyprus,Czech Republic, Germany, Den-
mark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, the United King-dom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, India,
Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan,Cambodia, Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Malaysia, Netherlands,
Norway, New Zealand,Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia,Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan, the United States, Viet Nam, and South Africa.
5Note that we need labor market tightness θmi ≥ 1 to ensure full employment. If θ
m
i ≥ 1 is violated, we
normalize fm to a much lower value to restore full employment.
6Because trade elasticity ϑs is not available for service sectors, we use aggregate trade elasticity (ϑs = 4.5)
in Caliendo and Parro (2015) for service sectors. ϑs = 4.5 is also a common trade elasticity used in the trade
literature (Simonovska and Waugh 2014).
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Table 1: Parameter Values and Sources
Parameters Moments
Notation Value Description Description
ρ 1.19 Discount rate (20 years) Annualized discount rate of 4%
β 2/3 Labor share Estimates in Gollin (2002)
φ 1.5 Elasticity of substitution btw skilled/unskilled Katz and Murphy (1992)
fm 0.1 Vacancy costs by skill types Normalization
ϑs 8.07 (10.86) Sector-specific trade elasticity Estimates in Caliendo and Parro (2015)
Ni 0.37 (1.01) Country-specific employment (NUS = 1) World Bank
dijs 23.85 (81.99) Origin-destination-sector-specific trade costs Trade shares between j and i
γlis 0.36 (0.14) Country-sector-specific value added share World I/O Table 2005
γs
′
is 0.03 (0.07) Country-sector-specific input–output linkages World I/O Table 2005
βis 0.05 (0.10) Country-sector-specific consumption shares World I/O Table 2005
τms 0.73 (0.22) On-the-job human capital accumulation by sec-
tors/skill types
RTE by sectors/skill types in the U.S.
τi 1.25 (0.41) Country-specific on-the-job learning returns Relation between RTE and GDPPC in
Lagakos et al. (2018)
αs 0.39 (0.08) Parameters governing sector-specific skill inten-
sities
Sector-specific college employment
share in the U.S. ACS 2005
ψi 0.36 (0.16) Country-specific relative productivity of college
workers (ψUS = 1)
Country-specific college premium
ei 0.69 (0.16) Time costs of becoming skilled Country-specific college population
share in Barro and Lee (2013)
Ais 1.29 (1.05) Country-sector-specific productivity (AUS,s = 1) Country-sector-specific output in 2005
κ 4 Shape parameter of Fréchet distribution for id-
iosyncratic education preferences
Reduced-form estimate in Column (1)
of Table 3
Notes: Parameter values for {ϑs, Ni, dijs, γlis, γ
s′
is , βis, τ
m
s , τi, αs, ψi, ei, Ais} refer to averages across all the pairs with specific values. Standard






.7 We calibrate input–output linkages {γlis, γ
s′
is} for each coun-
try according to OECD Input–Output Tables. We calibrate consumption share βis =
Yis+IMis−EXis−INTis∑
s Yis+IMis−EXis−INTis
, where Yis, EXis, IMis, and INTis represent sector-specific output, ex-
ports, imports, and usage as raw materials in production in the data.
Due to data availability, we assume that on-the-job learning parameters can be decom-
posed into τmis = τiτ
m
s ,m ∈ {l, h}. We measure τ
m
s by estimating RTE of 40 years of
experience separately for 20 sectors and two education groups using the U.S. Census and
ACS in the years 1980–2017, as discussed in Appendix C.4. The parameter τi captures
country-specific learning opportunities and matters for the life-cycle wage growth. To
calibrate τi, we can match the overall average wage relative to the average wage of the
7We compute actual trade shares in 2005 by combining OECD Bilateral Trade Database for Goods and
Services with OECD Input-Output Tables.
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data: average wage relative to average wage of entering cohort
(15)
where the left-hand side represents the overall average wage relative to the average wage
of the young cohort in the model. The right-hand side specifies the data counterpart,
where φx,i and Λx,i denote the RTE and the employment share for experience group x ∈
X ={0–4,...,35–39}, with the youngest cohort’s RTE φ0−4,i = 0. Due to the lack of data for
many countries, we use the relationship between RTE and GDP per capita for 20–24 years
of experience in Lagakos et al. (2018): φ20−24 = 0.89+0.26 log(GDPPCi/GDPPCUS). We set






. We use country-specific populations of different age groups from Barro
and Lee (2013) to obtain Λx,i.
The model moment in equation (15) relies on employment shares across sectors in equilib-
rium. Therefore, given a specific value of parameter κ (which we will calibrate in the next
subsection), we jointly calibrate the parameter τi together with country-sector-specific ag-
gregate productivity Ais, sector-specific skill intensities αs, country-specific productivity
of college workers ψi, and country-specific education costs ei. We target the following
moments in the data: 1) for each country, the overall average wage relative to the aver-
age wage of the young cohort, as mentioned earlier; 2) the country-sector-specific out-
put, drawn from OECD Input–Output Tables in 2005;8 3) the share of college workers
in employment for each sector in the U.S., computed from the ACS data in 2005; 4) the
country-specific college premium, collected from multiple data sources summarized in
Appendix C; and 5) the country-specific share of college graduates in 2005 from Barro
and Lee (2013). In all simulations, we consider balanced trade at the national level and
normalize the wage rate of the unskilled worker in the United States to be 1.
In Table 2, we compare the targeted moments in the baseline and in the data. In general,
we find that our model matches the targeted data moments very well. In appendix Fig-
ure 4, we further compare the country-sector output (targeted using Ais) and the origin-
8We draw actual data on country-sector-specific output from OECD Input–Output Tables in 2005. When
we compare output between the model and the data, we normalize each country’s sectoral output by the
U.S.’s sectoral output in the model and in the data. We normalize productivity Ais for the United States to
be 1, because only relative productivities matter in the model.
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destination-sector trade shares (untargeted though the trade costs are inferred from actual
trade shares) in the model and in the data. We find that our model does a pretty good job
with the regression coefficient of the data moments on the model moments being almost
unity.
Table 2: Targeted Moments in the Model vs Data
Moments Data Model
1. Country-specific ratio of average wage to average wages of young cohort 1.51 (0.18) 1.51 (0.18)
2. Country-sector-specific output (relative to US) 0.11 (0.24) 0.11 (0.24)
3. Sector-specific college employment share in the U.S. 0.43 (0.14) 0.42 (0.14)
4. Country-specific college premium 2.06 (0.73) 2.09 (0.74)
5. Country-specific college employment share 0.21 (0.12) 0.21 (0.12)
Notes: When we compare output between the model and the data, we normalize each country’s sectoral output by the U.S.’s
sectoral output in the model and in the data. The moments refer to averages across all the pairs with specific values. Standard
deviations are in parenthesis.
III.B Using Reduced-form Estimates to Discipline Parameter κ
We use reduced-form estimates to discipline parameter κ, which governs the density of
population that is on the verge of switching their education choices. We first estimate
how changes in the skill composition of exports affect education choices. Although sev-
eral studies (e.g., Blanchard and Olney 2016, Li 2018) documented similar evidence about
trade and schooling, we use our reduced-form evidence mainly to discipline the struc-
tural parameter in the calibration.
We identify this parameter in the data through the effect of a change in skill composition
of exports in the share of college graduates in the population which we assume are skill
workers in the data. To do this we classify workers with at least some college education as
skilled workers, and workers with a high-school education or lower as unskilled workers.
We estimate the following regression,
Coli,t+h = β0 + β1 ln(Unskill_Exi,t) + β2 ln(Skill_Exi,t) + β3Xi,t + γi + vt + ǫi,t, (16)
where Coli,t+h is the share of college graduates in the population in the year t+h. We allow
education choices to respond sluggishly by estimating the effects of h years ahead. The
control variables Xit include a logarithm of GDP and imports in the year t. γi and vt refer
to country and year fixed effects respectively. The independent variables Unskill_Exi,t
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Table 3: The Impact of Exports on Education Choices
(1) (2) (3) (4)
OLS⋆ 2SLS OLS 2SLS
Years ahead 10 10 15 15
log(unskilled exports) -0.040*** -0.123* -0.030** -0.145*
(0.011) (0.076) (0.013) (0.088)
log(skilled exports) 0.046*** 0.126 0.040*** 0.144
(0.011) (0.085) (0.013) (0.097)
Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes
Obs 831 831 732 732
R-squared 0.909 0.916 0.914 0.920
Notes: The dependent variable is the share of college graduates in the population in the year t+ h, where h is the
amount of years ahead. Columns 1 and 2 show the results for h = 10, and Columns 3 and 4 show the results for
h = 15. We truncate the upper and lower 1% percentile of log(unskilled exports) and log(skilled exports) to avoid
extreme values. The controls are: (1) country fixed effects; (2) year fixed effects; and (3) log GDP and log import in
year t. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis: * 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. Finally, ⋆ represents the targeted moment
in the indirect inference.









We proxy sector-specific skill intensity using the share of college workers in each sec-
tor for the Unite States in 2005, which is the baseline year of our calibration. Therefore,
Unskill_Exi,t is the sum of exports weighted by the U.S. sector-specific share of noncol-
lege workers in employment, which measures the export exposure of unskilled workers.
Similarly, Skill_Exi,t is the sum of exports weighted by the U.S. sector-specific share of
college workers in employment, representing the export exposure of skilled workers. We
draw trade data from Comtrade Database, education data from Barro and Lee (2013), and
GDP from Penn World Table 9.1 in the years t = 1965, 1970, ...2010, for the set of countries
with available data.9
It is likely that Unskill_Exi,t and Skill_Exi,t are endogenous, as more supply of skilled
workers could result in higher skill content of exports. To address this endogeneity issue,
9We also experimented with restricting the sample to the set of countries we study in the quantitative
analysis, which led to similar regression results.
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is the share of sectoral exports from country i to j in country i’s total ex-
ports in the initial year of our data set (1965).
Ex−i,j,s,t
Ex−i,j,s,1965
is growth of sectoral exports to
country j between 1965 and year t by countries other than country i. These two instru-
ments are relevant for the corresponding independent variables, with a correlation coef-
ficient of more than 0.5.10 Because we control for country fixed effects in the regression,
identification is based on idiosyncratic growth rates of exports across sectors, as shown
by Borusyak and Jaravel (2018).
Table 3 presents the estimation results. Column (1) shows that increasing unskilled ex-
ports by 1% reduced the share of college graduates in the population by 0.04 percentage
points after 10 years, whereas increasing skilled exports led to a larger share of college
graduates in the population after 10 years. Column (2) uses Bartik-type instruments in
equation (17) and still finds that growth in unskilled exports reduced the share of college
graduates in the population after 10 years. Notably, the IV estimates are much larger in
magnitude than the OLS estimates, which is in line with extant literature (e.g., Blanchard
and Olney 2016), which also finds a stronger estimated effect of exports on schooling us-
ing instrumental variables rather than using OLS. In Columns (3) and (4), we choose the
share of college graduates in the population for 15 years ahead (h=15) as the dependent
variable. Due to fewer observations, the estimates are noisier but yet quantitatively simi-
lar compared with their counterparts in Columns (1) and (2). In conclusion, we find that
increases in the skill demand from exports encouraged more education. The magnitude
of our reduced-form estimates is comparable to similar evidence in the literature.11
We use our reduced-form estimate in Column (1) of Table 3 to discipline parameter κ—
which governs the density of population that is on the verge of switching their education
10The first-stage F values are larger than 500 in all our IV regressions.
11For example, the OLS results in Blanchard and Olney (2016) show that increasing agriculture exports
by 1% reduced years of schooling by 0.003 years, and increasing unskilled manufacturing exports by 1%
reduced years of schooling by 0.0014 years. If we consider that college education requires 4 years of school-
ing, our OLS results suggest that increasing unskilled exports by 1% reduced average years of schooling by
0.0016 years. Because we only focus on two education levels, comparison of our reduced-form estimates
and the reduced-form evidence on how trade affects years of schooling in the literature is imperfect.
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Figure 1: Estimates Using Model-generated Data
The figure varies κ from 1 to 5 in the counterfactual exercise with changes in expenditure shares. The
vertical line represents the baseline value of κ = 4, when the estimate from the model-generated data
(-0.04) matches the estimate produced by the actual data (Column (1) of Table 3).
choices—using an indirect inference procedure. We proceed as follows. In our calibrated
model, we assume that expenditure shares are subject to an exogenous demand shock
βǫis = βis exp(ǫs), in line with our regression results about the effects of skill demand
on education choices. Exogenous shock ǫs is independent across sectors and distributed
according to ǫs ∼ N (−
ν2s
2
, νs), where νs is chosen to be the actual standard deviation of
10-year export growth in sector s between 1965 and 2010. For each value of parameter κ,
we simulate the model 100 times with different realizations of {ǫs} and then perform the
same OLS regression as in Column (1) of Table 3.12 We use the value of parameter κ to
target coefficient β1 = −0.04.
The intuition for this calibration is that a higher parameter κ corresponds to larger sen-
sitivity of education choices to changes in the skill composition of exports. Figure 1 con-
firms this monotonic relationship between parameter κ and the reduced-form estimate
from the model-generated data. The value κ = 4 minimizes the absolute difference be-
tween the model-generated estimate and its counterpart in the data. In Appendix C.6, we
also report counterfactual results using other values of parameter κ.
12For each value of parameter κ, we recalibrate all other parameters to match the relevant moments in Ta-
ble 1. When performing demand shocks in the calibrated model, we keep the 100 sequences of realizations
of {ǫs} constant across different values of parameter κ.
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III.C Gains from Trade
Armed with our calibrated model, we perform the counterfactual exercise of the autarkic
economy, by setting bilateral trade costs to be infinite dijs → ∞ ∀ i 6= j. We then compute
the proportional change in real consumption from the autarkic economy to the observed
equilibrium to derive the gains from trade. To understand how education choices and
on-the-job learning shape the gains, we compute proportional changes in the number of
college workers and lifetime wage growth from autarky to the observed equilibrium. We
compute lifetime wage growth as the percent increase in the overall average wage relative
to the young cohort’s average wage, measuring the RTE in the model.
Table 4 reports the results for the largest 25 economies in our calibrated model. Column
(1) of Table 4 reports the overall gains from trade. Columns (2) and (3) further decom-
pose the overall gains from trade into the ACR formula and the gains due to changes in
skill acquisition according to Proposition 1. Consistent with the trade literature (e.g., Ra-
mondo and Rodríguez-Clare 2013, Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare 2014), we find that the
overall gains from trade are larger for small open economies, such as Canada, Nether-
lands, Malaysia, Sweden, and Denmark. In particular, the values in terms of the ACR
formula in Column (2) are similar to the results in Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014)
who study the gains from trade in a multisector Eaton–Kortum model with input–output
linkages.13 This result indicates that our quantitative results are reasonable.
Column (3) exhibits the gains from trade due to changes in skill acquisition. In compar-
ison to the overall gains from trade, the gains from trade due to changes in skill acqui-
sition are relatively small, but nonetheless vastly different across countries. The United
States and the United Kingdom are the two largest winners in trade-induced shifts in
skill acquisition, largely due to their comparative advantage in high-skill services and
skill-intensive manufacturing sectors. For example, the United States’ gains from trade
due to skill acquisition are 0.50%, which accounts for 7.2% of the overall gains from trade.
Its share of employment in high-skill services increases from 47.0% in autarky to 49.0%
with trade openness. Despite an overall shift of employment toward high-skill services,
within manufacturing, the share of employment in sectors with higher skill intensities
than the median also rises from 57.8% to 58.7% after trade openness. As a result, the
13For example, in our calibrated model, the gains from trade computed by the ACR formula are 6.5%
and 10.0% for the United States and China respectively. In a multisector Eaton–Kortum model with input–
output linkages in Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014), the gains are 8.3% and 11.5% for the United States
and China respectively. Costinot and Rodríguez-Clare (2014) tend to find larger gains from trade than ours,
because their calibrated model considers more sectors.
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Table 4: Gains from Trade
Decomposition of gains from trade Measures of skill acquisition
Gains from trade ACR formula Skill acquisition # college workers
Lifetime
wage growth
Country (1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5)
USA 6.98% 6.48% 0.50% 0.87% 0.59%
CHN 9.88% 9.98% -0.10% -0.31% -0.37%
JPN 4.05% 4.21% -0.16% -0.45% -0.33%
IND 8.30% 7.81% 0.49% 3.45% -1.46%
DEU 23.59% 24.33% -0.74% -1.33% -1.55%
FRA 14.78% 14.77% 0.01% 0.55% -0.07%
GBR 17.24% 16.36% 0.88% 2.33% 1.46%
RUS 16.23% 16.47% -0.24% -2.48% -0.45%
ITA 10.87% 11.15% -0.28% -0.81% -0.61%
BRA 7.00% 7.68% -0.68% -1.99% -1.22%
MEX 12.29% 12.69% -0.40% -1.71% 0.16%
KOR 10.90% 11.15% -0.25% 0.72% -0.90%
CAN 27.12% 27.50% -0.38% -2.19% -0.37%
ESP 15.60% 15.43% 0.17% 0.68% 0.29%
IDN 20.35% 20.69% -0.34% -3.09% -0.96%
TUR 10.60% 10.81% -0.21% -0.89% -0.47%
AUS 13.73% 13.47% 0.26% -0.52% 0.68%
NLD 97.37% 97.92% -0.55% 0.73% -1.51%
POL 21.29% 21.81% -0.52% -1.23% -1.32%
ZAF 22.25% 22.70% -0.45% -2.24% -0.42%
ARG 12.84% 13.61% -0.77% -3.32% -2.07%
MYS 61.79% 61.78% 0.01% 0.02% -0.05%
POL 21.29% 21.81% -0.53% -1.23% -1.32%
SWE 36.91% 37.42% -0.49% -1.14% -1.73%
CHE 57.15% 56.96% 0.19% 2.03% -0.07%
Average 22.42% 22.60% -0.18% -0.54% -0.56%
United States enjoys more aggregate human capital from trade openness, with a 0.87%
growth in the number of college workers and a 0.59% increase in lifetime wage growth,
shown in Columns (4) and (5).
Another big winner is India, which gains a 0.49% increase in real consumption due to
trade-induced shifts in skill acquisition. Most notably, the number of college workers
increases by 3.45% if India moves from autarky to an open economy, which is partly
induced by India’s comparative advantage in services. However, India’s lifetime wage
growth tends to be lower after trade openness, because trade openness also induces real-
location of employment toward agriculture with low on-the-job learning opportunities.
Many countries experience losses from trade due to skill acquisition. Among the devel-
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Figure 2: Changes in Lifetime Wage Growth after Trade Openness
oped countries reported in Table 4, Germany loses most with a 0.74% decrease in real
consumption because of trade-induced shifts in skill acquisition. This is because after
trade openness, Germany shifts employment from services to manufacturing sectors that
tend to incur relatively lower skill requirements and on-the-job learning compared with
services. Among the developing countries presented in Table 4, Argentina and Brazil ex-
perience the most losses (a 0.77% and 0.68% reduction in real consumption, respectively),
because these two countries enjoy comparative advantage in agriculture that entails low
skill intensity and few on-the-job learning opportunities.
Finally, Figure 2 plots proportional changes in lifetime wage growth from autarky to the
observed equilibrium against log GDP per capita in 2005, for the set of countries in our
quantitative analysis. Developed countries tend to enjoy better on-the-job learning oppor-
tunities after trade openness. This is because after trade openness, developed countries
specialize in manufacturing sectors with higher RTE and have more college workers who
enjoy faster on-the-job learning than unskilled workers.
IV Robustness
Our baseline model abstracts from job turnover and workers’ and firms’ internalization
of benefits from human capital accumulation. To understand whether our quantitative
results are robust to these simplifications, this section studies a more realistic extension
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of our model with rich labor market dynamics. We first present the model extension in
Section IV.A and then report quantitative findings of the extended model in Section IV.B.
IV.A Model Extension
We now discuss how we extend the model from Section II. We add the following features:
Labor Market. We assume that labor markets are separate by sectors and worker types.
The matching function is M(Umis , V
m








is are the total amount
of searchers and vacancies, respectively, for workers of type m ∈ {l, h} in country i and
sector s. We still abstract from unemployment by assuming that vacancy costs are small
enough.
Workers. We now assume that workers can live for potentially infinite periods with util-
ity from consumption
∑∞
τ=0 (1 + ρ)
−τ log (cτ ). The capital market is complete to avoid
precautionary saving.14 A proportion δd of workers die in each period after production
and consumption. In the beginning of each period, old workers who died in the last pe-
riod are replaced by the same number of new entrants, who determine whether to become
skilled and then start to search for jobs. To model that college education leads to less pro-
duction time in addition to education costs in the pre-period, we assume that new skilled
workers spend the first four years not working. Alive employed workers are exogenously
separated from their employers with a possibility δp and become unemployed.
New entrants and laid-off workers choose the sector to look for jobs. To generate upward-
sloping labor supply curves on the sector level, we follow Tombe and Zhu (2019) to as-
sume that workers maximize cash flow from the job, facing idiosyncratic taste shocks y
that are i.i.d. across sectors and individuals, according to a Fréchet distribution exp(−y−χ).
The parameter χ > 0 captures the dispersion of idiosyncratic tastes and therefore the
elasticity of labor supply to wage rates. One period working in sector s generates a pro-
portional increase of τmis in human capital. Therefore, for workers of type m ∈ {l, h} in









14Because our extended model allows for exogenous separation, workers have motives for precautionary
saving. If the capital market is incomplete, workers’ consumption will rely on their amount of assets, which
complicates the model solutions and is beyond the scope of this paper. With complete capital markets and
no aggregate uncertainty, the prices of Arrow–Debreu securities in country i are determined by the interest









wmis is the discounted cash flow for a job in sector
s, with wmis denoting the wage rate per efficiency unit of time. Searchers’ original human
capital does not show up in probability Λmis , as its effects on wage returns are identical
across sectors. Because separation rates are identical across sectors, Λmis also represents
sectoral employment share in country i for workers of type m ∈ {l, h}.
Firms. Firms post vacancies each period to attract job searchers. Instead of assuming that
firms are myopic as in Section II, we now assume that firms post vacancies by considering
the present value of workers’ future benefits to the firm. This means that firms internalize
the benefits from workers’ on-the-job human capital accumulation, weighted by workers’
potential death and exogenous separations.
IV.B Quantitative Results
We then take this extended model to the data. One period in the model is one year, with
the yearly discount rate ρ = 0.04. The death rate δd = 0.025 matches the working life of
40 years, and δp = 0.2 is based on 1.5–3% monthly job separation rates in the US (Shimer
2012, Faberman, Mueller, Sahin and Topa 2017). We recalibrate {τi, αs, ψi, ei, Ais, κ} in
Table 1, jointly with the newly introduced elasticity of labor supply χ. In addition to the
relevant moments specified in Table 1, we use the new parameter χ to target the between-
sector dispersion of average wages in the U.S. in 2005. Our intuition is that larger labor-
supply elasticity χ implies stronger responses of sectoral employment to sectoral wage
changes and therefore lower between-sector wage dispersion. Appendix C provides the
parameter values and the comparison of the targeted moments.
Due to the lack of an analytical solution for the gains from trade, we perform two coun-
terfactual exercises to obtain the gains from trade due to changes in skill acquisition. In
the first exercise, we set bilateral trade costs to be infinite dijs → ∞ ∀ i 6= j. With this
exercise, we quantify the overall gains from trade. In the second exercise, we assume that
for workers of type m ∈ {l, h} in country i, on-the-job learning opportunities are identical
across sectors by letting τmis = τ̄
m
i ∀ s, where τ̄
m
i is the employment-weighted average of
τmis across sectors. We also fix the share of college workers in each country. Under these re-
strictions, we recalibrate the model to match all data moments specified earlier.15 We then
set bilateral trade costs to be infinite dijs → ∞ ∀ i 6= j. With this exercise, we quantify the
15We keep the elasticity of labor supply χ unchanged as in the original calibration and thus do not target
the between-sector wage dispersion in the recalibration, because the gains from trade are sensitive to the
labor-supply elasticity (see e.g., Galle et al. 2017).
22
Table 5: Gains from Trade (Extended Model)




Skill acquisition # college workers
Lifetime
wage growth
Country (1) (2) (3)=(1)-(2) (4) (5)
USA 10.64% 9.98% 0.66% 0.76% 0.98%
CHN 12.39% 12.48% -0.09% -0.01% -0.12%
JPN 5.49% 5.61% -0.12% -0.32% 0.07%
IND 14.58% 14.08% 0.50% 3.96% -0.02%
DEU 19.52% 20.66% -1.14% -0.42% -1.25%
FRA 19.69% 19.71% -0.02% 0.14% 0.45%
GBR 22.11% 20.87% 1.24% 2.57% 1.37%
RUS 21.72% 21.49% 0.23% -4.43% 0.17%
ITA 13.73% 14.19% -0.46% -0.97% -0.06%
BRA 6.75% 7.58% -0.83% -2.44% -0.41%
MEX 12.41% 12.79% -0.38% -1.64% 0.03%
KOR 13.35% 13.66% -0.31% 1.60% -0.27%
CAN 28.46% 28.60% -0.14% -2.80% -0.10%
ESP 21.30% 21.13% 0.17% -0.03% 0.83%
IDN 28.81% 29.41% -0.60% -4.91% 0.16%
TUR 14.41% 14.72% -0.31% -1.42% 0.20%
AUS 21.45% 20.80% 0.65% -1.74% 1.43%
NLD 90.86% 92.80% -1.94% 0.56% -1.51%
POL 19.21% 20.52% -1.31% -0.36% -1.26%
ZAF 28.80% 29.52% -0.72% -3.06% 0.10%
ARG 13.06% 14.01% -0.95% -5.21% -0.34%
MYS 76.42% 76.79% -0.37% -0.87% 0.38%
POL 19.21% 20.52% -1.31% -0.36% -1.26%
SWE 42.17% 42.89% -0.72% -1.51% -0.49%
CHE 55.85% 56.00% -0.15% 1.58% 0.33%
Average 25.30% 25.63% -0.33% -0.85% -0.02%
gains from trade without changes in skill acquisition. By deducting the gains from trade
without changes in skill acquisition from the overall gains from trade, we obtain the gains
from trade due to changes in skill acquisition. To understand how education levels and
on-the-job learning change due to trade openness, for the first counterfactual exercise, we
also measure changes in skill acquisition from autarky to the observed equilibrium in the
same way as in Table 4.
Table 5 presents the results for the largest 25 economies in our calibrated model. Col-
umn (1) reports the overall gains from trade in our extended model, which are slightly
larger than the gains from trade in our baseline model shown in Table 4, with a correla-
tion coefficient of 0.98. The gains from trade in the extended model are larger than in the
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baseline model, possibly caused by the difficulty of employment adjustments in the ex-
tended model, for which the sectoral labor supply is upward-sloping. In line with Galle,
Rodríguez-Clare and Yi (2017), we find that as sectoral labor supply becomes more elastic
(χ→ ∞), the gains from trade tend to become smaller in the extended model.
Column (3) of Table 5 reports the gains from trade due to changes in skill acquisition
in the extended model, which are quantitatively similar to our results shown in Table 4
for the baseline model, with a correlation coefficient of 0.87.16 Still, the United States,
the United Kingdom, and India experience gains from trade-induced skill acquisition,
whereas Germany, Brazil, and Argentina suffer losses. Reassuringly, in Columns (4) and
(5) of Table 5, trade-induced proportional changes in the number of college workers and
lifetime wage growth are also analogous to the corresponding results for the baseline
model, with correlation values of 0.94 and 0.84, respectively. These results suggest that
our quantitative findings in the baseline model are robust.
V Cross-Country Evidence on Exports and OTJ Learning
This section presents suggestive empirical evidence on the relationship between trade
and on the job skill acquisition that supports our quantitative findings.
We measure on-the-job learning opportunities by using returns to experience (RTE).17 The
recent literature suggests large differences in RTE between sectors. In an extensive study,
Islam et al. (2018) use 1,041 household surveys that include 23 million individuals from
145 countries (which accounts for 95% of the world population). They find population-
weighted RTE for an extra year of experience is 2.6% (services), 2% (industry), and 1.3%
(agriculture). These sectoral differences hold for developing and developed countries (see
Table 1 in Islam et al. (2018)). Herrendorf and Schoellman (2015) use the Current Popula-
tion Survey and also document that in the United States, the wage-experience profile for
nonagricultural workers is two times as steep as for agricultural workers.
We document new evidence by connecting on-the-job learning with trade. To isolate the
16In this extended model, we need recalibration to isolate the gains from trade due to changes in skill
acquisition. This process may introduce additional computation errors especially for countries with large
trade openness (e.g., Netherlands and Malaysia), and therefore we interpret the results with caution and
mostly as a robustness check.
17We interpret RTE as reflecting on-the-job learning opportunities. In principle, RTE may also reflect
changes in workers’ bargaining power. There is still much debate on how to decompose RTE into changes
in human capital and changes in bargaining power, which usually relies on the structure of the model (e.g.,
Bagger, Fontaine, Postel-Vinay and Robin 2014, Gregory 2019).
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Figure 3: Weighted Average RTE across Sectors
(a) Agriculture, Industry, and Services (b) 2-digit Manufacturing Sectors
effects of trade-induced sector reallocation, we use the average RTE for agriculture, in-
dustry (manufacturing, mining, and public utility), and services from Islam et al. (2018)
and normalize RTE in services to be 1 for ease of description. We compute RTE for each
country’s exports, which is an employment-weighted average RTE across three sectors’
exports, by combining data from OECD Input–Output Tables and the World Bank.18 To
shed light on how trade affects RTE, we also compute RTE by sectors for each country’s
overall economy, adjusted for export intensity19 to avoid that different tradability of sec-
tors20 drives the results. We compute all these measures for the year 2005.
Figure 3a presents the results. We highlight three findings. First, RTE by sectors of ex-
ports increased with GDP per capita, as developed countries tended to export more in
services that embody the highest RTE among three sectors. Second, poor countries ap-
peared to shift employment toward sectors with higher RTE by exporting, as their RTE
by sectors of exports tended to be higher than RTE by sectors of the overall economy.
Third, the relative ratio of RTE by sectors of exports to RTE by sectors of the economy
varied markedly across countries, suggesting large heterogeneity in countries’ benefits
from on-the-job learning.
Finally, using aggregate sectors may mask the vast amount of heterogeneity in RTE across
18We draw output and export data from OECD Input–Output Tables and employment data from the
World Bank. By assuming that output per capita is identical between producing domestic sales and pro-
ducing exports, we compute the amount of employment used to produce exports in each sector for each
country.
19For each country, we first multiply each sector’s output with the global average export intensity for
that sector to compute the hypothetical sector composition of exports. Then we compute RTE for this
hypothetical sector composition of exports.
20In the data, manufacturing is much more export-intensive than agriculture and services.
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detailed sectors, especially for manufacturing that is export-intensive. With this in mind,
we use the U.S. Census and the American Community Survey (ACS) in the years 1980–
2017 to estimate RTE after 35–40 years of experience for 16 2-digit ISIC manufacturing
sectors21 in the United States, by applying Mincer regressions and the Heckman–Locker–
Taber method (Lagakos et al. 2018) detailed in Appendix C.4.
We use the RTE estimates from U.S. manufacturing sectors to compute an export-weighted
average RTE and an output-weighted average RTE for each country in 2005.22 Figure 3b
presents the results.23 The results show that even though rich countries already produced
more in manufacturing sectors with higher RTE, they shifted employment toward manu-
facturing sectors with even higher RTE by exporting. This result suggests that accounting
for detailed manufacturing sectors could increase gains in human capital from trade for
developed countries. Due to different implications of Figures 3a and 3b about which
countries gained more RTE after trade openness. Our quantitative analysis answers this
question.
The calibrated model shows that indeed developed countries tend to enjoy better on-the-
job learning opportunities after trade openness, which is driven by developed countries
specializing in manufacturing sectors with higher RTE and having more college workers
who enjoy faster on-the-job learning than unskilled workers.
VI Conclusion
Whereas researchers have devoted much attention to the gains from trade, mostly taking
workers’ skills as given, it is reasonable to think that trade can bring additional benefits
(losses) by changing workers’ education choices and on-the-job learning opportunities.
In this paper, we have taken a step in this direction by developing a multisector Eaton–
Kortum model with heterogeneous skill intensities and on-the-job learning opportunities
across sectors. In the model, workers decide whether to become skilled and accumulate
21ISIC stands for International Standard Industrial Classification, and we use ISIC Revision 3.0. These
2-digit manufacturing sectors include: Food Products, Beverages, and Tobaccos (ISIC 15–16), Textiles (ISIC
17–19), Wood (ISIC 20), Paper Products (ISIC 21–22), Coke, Refined Petroleum Products and Nuclear Fuel
(ISIC 23), Chemicals (ISIC 24), Rubber and Plastics Products (ISIC 25), Other Non-metallic Mineral Products
(ISIC 26), Basic Metals (ISIC 27), Fabricated Metal Products (ISIC 28), Machinary and Equipment (ISIC 29),
Computer, Electronic, and Optical Products (ISIC 30, 32, 33), Electrical Machinery and Apparatus (ISIC 31),
Motor Vehicles, Trailers, and Semi-trailers (ISIC 34), Other Transport Equipment (ISIC 35), and Manufac-
turing n.e.c and Recycling (ISIC 36–37).
22Employment shares for detailed manufacturing sectors are not available in our data set.
23We normalize the U.S.’s export-weighted average RTE for manufacturing sectors to be 0.75, to be con-
sistent with Figure 3a, which normalizes RTE in industry to be 0.75.
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human capital on the job. Our model can analytically solve for the gains from trade,
through an ACR formula, augmented by gains due to changes in skill acquisition.
The calibrated model reveals that the gains from trade due to changes in skill acquisition
are vastly different across countries, with large gains for the United States, the United
Kingdom, and India, as well as big losses for Germany, Brazil, and Argentina. The im-
portant reason for these countries’ different outcomes is their different specialization pat-
terns after trade openness. Finally, the quantitative results show that developed countries
enjoy better on-the-job learning opportunities after trade openness. We provide empirical
support for the channels studied in this paper. Particularly, we document some evidence
on how exporting may alter on-the-job learning opportunities. In particular, rich coun-
tries specialized in manufacturing sectors and services with higher on-the-job learning
opportunities by exporting.
Our paper emphasizes how trade-induced sector reallocation affects welfare by chang-
ing workers’ education choices and, more importantly, on-the-job learning opportunities.
Many questions remain quantitatively unexplored about trade and skill acquisition, such
as how trade affects skill specialization through shifts in the demand for different occu-
pations or reallocation of workers across firms.
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Appendix A Proofs
Appendix A.1 Share of College Graduates






)). Given that ǫl and ǫh are distributed according to G(ǫ) = exp(−ǫ−κ),
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The first equality uses the definition of the share of skilled workers. The second equality
uses the definition of G(ǫ). The third equality computes the integral.
Appendix A.2 CES Trade Shares and Prices
Note that pijs(ω) = dijspiis(ω) =
dijswis
βzis(ω)
. Due to CES Preferences, the share of country j’s












where Ωijs = {ω ∈ [0, 1], pijs(ω) ≤ pkjs(ω) ∀ k 6= i} is the set of goods sourced from country
i.
Note that zis(ω) follows the Fréchet distribution Fis(z) = exp(−Aisz







































































The first equality uses the definition of pijs and Ωijs. The second equality uses the distribu-
















1−σdω into equation (18), we obtain trade shares in equation (10).


































1−σdω in the second equality.
Appendix A.3 The Gains from Trade




































































































where Ci is some country-specific constant. The first equality uses the definition of real
consumption. The second equality uses Pi =
∏
s (Pis/βis)
βis and price index in equation
(20). The third equality uses the expression for trade shares in equation (10). The fourth





Note that the gains from trade is GTi =
Wi
W oi
. By evaluating Wi and W
o
i with equation (21),
we can obtain the formula in Proposition 1.
Appendix A.4 The Gains of Trade with Intermediate Inputs






































where Cis is a constant.
Let x̂ = log(x′/x) denote the log change of variable x from the observed equilibrium to




















where αiss′ is the (s, s
′) element of the Leontief inverse matrix (I − Γi)
−1. Let S be the


























































































Gains due to changes in skill acquisition
Appendix B Extensions of the Model
Appendix B.1 Ben–Porath Model for On-the-job Learning
In this section, we model on-the-job learning endogenously using a Ben–Porath model.
For ease of description, we abstract from superscripts for workers’ types. Assume that
learning for 0 ≤ t ≤ 1 units of time increases human capital by bist
γ , where bis measures
returns to investments in learning for country i and sector s. For example, in developed
countries, bis is typically higher due to factors such as more available knowledge. 0 < γ <
1 captures the diminishing returns of learning.
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where the left-hand side is the costs of learning (less production time), while the right-
hand side is the gains of learning (higher future wages). Because wages appear in both
marginal costs and marginal benefits, they cancel out. Clearly, in this setting, the optimal







which is pinned down by parameters. Therefore, trade openness will not affect on-the-job
learning if bis (which captures available knowledge) remains constant after trade open-
ness. Without loss of generality, we can normalize the production time for young workers







changes in efficiency units between young and old. With these changes, the model with
endogenous on-the-job learning decisions of the Ben–Porath type is identical to our base-
line model with exogenous on-the-job learning.
Appendix C Data Description and Robustness Checks
Appendix C.1 Countries
We consider the following 53 countries in the calibration: Argentina, Australia, Aus-
tria, Bulgaria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada, Switzerland, Chile, China, Cyprus,
Czech Republic, Germany, Denmark, Spain, Estonia, Finland, France, the United King-
dom, Greece, Croatia, Hungary, Indonesia, India, Ireland, Iceland, Israel, Italy, Japan,
Cambodia, Korea, Lithuania, Latvia, Mexico, Malaysia, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand,
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Slovak Republic, Slovenia,
Sweden, Thailand, Turkey, Taiwan, the United States, Viet Nam, and South Africa.
Appendix C.2 Sector Decomposition
Table 6 lists the set of sectors we consider in the calibrated model. The raw data from
OECD Input–Output Tables contains 34 sectors—agriculture, mining, 16 manufacturing
sectors, and 16 service sectors. For precision of estimating RTE, we collapse 16 service
sectors into high-skill and low-skill services, based on the share of college workers in
employment in each service sector. Specially, we use the U.S. ACS 2005 data and classify a
service sector to belong to high-skill services if its share of college workers in employment
35
lies above the median among all service sectors.
Table 6: Sector Decomposition
Sector name ISIC Rev.3
% college workers
(U.S. ACS 2005)
1. Agriculture, hunting, forestry, and fishing 01–05 31.9
2. Mining and quarrying 10–14 36.6
Manufacturing sectors:
3. Food products, beverages, and tobacco 15–16 31.5
4. Textiles, textile products, leather and footwear 17–19 25.8
5. Wood and products of wood and cork 20 25.5
6. Pulp, paper, paper products, printing and publishing 21–22 49.2
7. Coke, refined petroleum products, and nuclear fuel 23 56.8
8. Chemicals and chemical products 24 61.7
9. Rubber and plastics products 25 33.6
10. Other non-metallic mineral products 26 31.7
11. Basic metals 27 32.4
12. Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 28 33.1
13. Machinery and equipment n.e.c 29 40.7
14. Computer, electronic, and optical products 30, 32, 33 64.4
15. Electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c 31 57.9
16. Motor vehicles, trailers, and semi-trailers 34 38.9
17. Other transport equipment 35 59.7
18. Manufacturing n.e.c.; recycling 36, 37 36.3
19. Low-skill services (utility, construction, wholesale, hotel, trans-
port, and personal services)
40–63, 90–95 37.7
20. High-skill services (telecommunications, finance, real estate,
renting of machinery, computer activities, research and business ac-
tivities, public administration, education, and health work)
64–89 68.7
Appendix C.3 College Premium
We collect the college premium for each country in 2005 (or the nearest year when the
data is available) from multiple data sources, as shown by Table 7.
Appendix C.4 Estimating RTE from US
In our empirical analysis, we present evidence on RTE after 40 years of experience. To
estimate RTE for detailed sectors, we use the U.S. Census and ACS from IPUMS for the
years 1980, 1990, 2000–2017 for which we have data on earnings and hours worked. We
first build a measure of potential experience for each individual that we define as the
minimum of age minus 18 and age minus years of schooling minus 6 (min{age-18,age-
6-educ}). We calculate the wage-experience profile for each industry by computing the
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Table 7: Data Sources of the College Premium
Country Source
Argentina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Malaysia, Philippines, Saudi Ara-
bia, Thailand, Japan
Statistical Yearbook
Australia, Austria, Belgium-Luxembourg, Brazil, Canada,
Switzerland, Chile, Czech Republic, Denmark, Spain, Estonia,
Finland, the United Kingdom, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ko-
rea, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway, New Zealand, Poland, Portu-
gal, Slovak Republic, Sweden
OECD Database
China, Greece, India, Iceland, Russia, Taiwan, the United States,
South Africa
Luxembourg Income Study




Cambodia Lall and Sakellariou (2010)
Viet Nam Moock et al. (1997)
average wage increase in 5-year experience bins relative to the first bin (0–4 years of po-
tential experience) of which the average wage increase is normalized to 0. Specifically, we




φxDxict + bXict + γt + γc + ǫict, (22)
where i and t represent individuals and years respectively. log(wict) denotes the log
hourly wage for an individual i. γt represents time fixed effects, and γc is cohort fixed
effect. Dxict are dummies for each experience bin, and finally Xict are individual controls.
Note that there is a well-known collinearity problem if we include year and cohort fixed
effects and potential experience in the regression (Deaton 1997), as wage growth over time
can be induced by either experience or time effects. To construct the wage-experience pro-
file, we rely on the Deaton (1997) and Heckman et al. (1998) method used by Lagakos et al.
(2018). Specifically, we first decompose time effects into a trend and a cyclical component:
γt = gt+ et. (23)
where g denotes aggregate time trends. Specially, we restrict the cyclical component et
to average zero over the time period
∑
t et = 0 and to be orthogonal to the time trend∑
t ett = 0. These assumptions are also made in Deaton (1997) and Aguiar and Hurst
(2013) in estimating life-cycle profiles. To pin down the time trend g, we build on the
assumptions from Heckman et al. (1998). The idea of this approach is to assume that there
are no experience effects at the end of the working life of agents, and thus, all wage growth
in this last period has to come from other sources which are assumed to be common
across all cohorts. This approach requires two parameter values: the value for human
capital depreciation rate and the amount of years at the end of the worker’s life cycle
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Table 8: Targeted Moments in the Model vs Data
Moments Data Model
1. Country-specific ratio of average wage to average wages of young cohort 1.51 (0.18) 1.51 (0.18)
2. Country-sector-specific output (relative to US) 0.11 (0.24) 0.11 (0.24)
3. Sector-specific college employment share in the U.S. 0.43 (0.14) 0.42 (0.14)
4. Country-specific college premium 2.06 (0.73) 2.09 (0.74)
5. Country-specific college employment share 0.21 (0.12) 0.21 (0.12)
Notes: When we compare output between the model and the data, we normalize each country’s sectoral output by the U.S.’s
sectoral output in the model and in the data. The moments refer to averages across all the pairs with specific values. Standard
deviations are in parenthesis.
with no wage growth from experience. We assume that there is no depreciation in human
capital. And there is no experience effect in the last 10 years of workers’ life cycle, which is
between 30 and 40 years of experience (as we censor experience at 40 years of experience),
following the main specification by Lagakos et al. (2018). Thus, for each one sector in
Table 6 and each type of worker (skilled/unskilled), we separately estimate regression
(22) by imposing γt = gt + et such that there is no wage growth coming from experience
in the last 10 years of individuals’ working life in this sector. More details of this approach
can be found in Lagakos et al. (2018).
Appendix C.5 Comparison of Moments in the Model and in the Data
In Table 8, we compare the targeted moments in the baseline and in the data. In gen-
eral, we find that our model matches the targeted data moments very well. In Figure
4, we further compare the country-sector output (targeted using Ais) and the origin-
destination-sector trade shares (untargeted though the trade costs are inferred from actual
trade shares) in the model and in the data. We find that our model does a pretty good job
with the regression coefficient of the data moments on the model moments being almost
unity.
Appendix C.6 Robustness Checks for Parameter κ
In Table 9, we report the gains from trade due to changes in skill acquisition for differ-
ent values of parameter κ. It is worth noting that when we perform the counterfactual
exercise for each value of parameter κ, we recalibrate all other parameters to match the
relevant moments in Table 1. We highlight two main findings. First, as parameter κ be-
comes larger, the gains from trade due to changes in skill acquisition are more volatile
across countries. This is because a higher value of parameter κ makes education choices
more responsive to trade openness. Second, the gains from trade due to changes in skill
acquisition are not very sensitive to the value of parameter κ, as the gains are also deter-
mined by trade-induced changes in on-the-job learning opportunities.
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Figure 4: Comparison of Output and Trade Shares in the Model and in the Data
(a) Country-sector Output (b) Origin-destination-sector Trade Share
Table 9: Gains from Trade Due to Changes in Skill Acquisition
baseline (κ = 4) κ = 1 κ = 3 κ = 5 κ = 10 κ = 100
Country (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
USA 0.50% 0.38% 0.49% 0.52% 0.55% 0.60%
CHN -0.10% -0.09% -0.09% -0.10% -0.10% -0.10%
JPN -0.16% -0.14% -0.16% -0.16% -0.14% -0.15%
IND 0.49% 0.24% 0.45% 0.52% 0.60% 0.66%
DEU -0.74% -0.68% -0.73% -0.75% -0.76% -0.78%
FRA 0.01% -0.01% 0.00% 0.01% 0.02% 0.03%
GBR 0.88% 0.71% 0.84% 0.89% 0.93% 0.98%
RUS -0.24% -0.10% -0.20% -0.23% -0.30% -0.54%
ITA -0.28% -0.26% -0.28% -0.28% -0.28% -0.29%
BRA -0.68% -0.57% -0.66% -0.71% -0.74% -0.79%
MEX -0.40% -0.20% -0.36% -0.42% -0.45% -0.50%
KOR -0.25% -0.31% -0.27% -0.25% -0.20% -0.18%
CAN -0.38% -0.21% -0.36% -0.40% -0.45% -0.49%
ESP 0.17% 0.13% 0.16% 0.17% 0.18% 0.19%
IDN -0.34% -0.26% -0.32% -0.34% -0.37% -0.39%
TUR -0.21% -0.17% -0.20% -0.21% -0.22% -0.23%
AUS 0.26% 0.29% 0.26% 0.25% 0.24% 0.24%
NLD -0.55% -0.60% -0.57% -0.56% -0.67% -0.66%
POL -0.52% -0.46% -0.51% -0.52% -0.54% -0.56%
ZAF -0.45% -0.29% -0.42% -0.46% -0.50% -0.54%
ARG -0.77% -0.64% -0.75% -0.78% -0.81% -0.84%
MYS 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.01% 0.00% 0.01%
POL -0.53% -0.46% -0.51% -0.52% -0.54% -0.56%
SWE -0.49% -0.48% -0.51% -0.52% -0.54% -0.55%
CHE 0.19% 0.07% 0.17% 0.20% 0.06% 0.09%
Average -0.18% -0.16% -0.18% -0.19% -0.20% -0.21%
Std 0.42% 0.34% 0.40% 0.43% 0.45% 0.48%
Notes: In this table, we vary parameter κ from 1 to 100 in the baseline model and then compute
the gains from trade due to changes in skill acquisition. When we perform the counterfactual
exercise for each value of parameter κ, we recalibrate all other parameters to match the relevant
moments in Table 1.
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Appendix C.7 Parameter Values and Moments in the Extended Model
Table 10 and 11 present the parameter values and the targeted moments in the extended
model. Overall, our model matches the data moments pretty well. It is worth mentioning
that we also recalibrate the parameter κ to match the reduced-form estimate in Section ??,
following the same procedure as in Section III.B. The new calibrated value κ = 4.2 is close
to the value (κ = 4) in the baseline model.
Table 10: Parameter Values in the Extended Model
Parameters Moments
Notation Value Description Description
ρ 0.04 Discount rate (one year) Annualized discount rate of 4%
δd 0.025 Death rate Working life of 40 years
δp 0.20 Exogenous separation rate 1.5-3% U.S. monthly separation rates
β 2/3 Labor share Estimates in Gollin (2002)
φ 1.5 Elasticity of substitution btw skilled/unskilled Katz and Murphy (1992)
fm 0.1 Vacancy costs by skill types Normalization
ϑs 8.07 (10.86) Sector-specific trade elasticity Estimates in Caliendo and Parro (2015)
Ni 0.37 (1.01) Country-specific employment (NUS = 1) World Bank
dijs 23.85 (81.99) Origin-destination-sector-specific trade costs Trade shares between j and i
γlis 0.36 (0.14) Country-sector-specific value added share World I/O Table 2005
γs
′
is 0.03 (0.07) Country-sector-specific input–output linkages World I/O Table 2005
βis 0.05 (0.10) Country-sector-specific consumption shares World I/O Table 2005
τms 0.73 (0.22) On-the-job learning returns by sectors/skill
types
RTE by sectors/skill types in the U.S.
τi 0.01 (0.003) Country-specific on-the-job learning returns Relation between RTE and GDPPC in
Lagakos et al. (2018)
αs 0.45 (0.12) Parameters governing sector-specific skill inten-
sities
Sector-specific college employment
share in the U.S. ACS 2005
ψi 0.35 (0.16) Country-specific relative productivity of college
workers (ψUS = 1)
Country-specific college premium
ei 0.46 (0.24) Time costs of becoming skilled Country-specific college population
share in Barro and Lee (2013)
Ais 1.25 (1.08) Country-sector-specific productivity (AUS,s = 1) Country-sector-specific output in 2005
κ 4.2 Shape parameter of Fréchet distribution for id-
iosyncratic education preferences
Reduced-form estimate in Section ??
χ 5.1 Shape parameter of Fréchet distribution for id-
iosyncratic sector preferences
Between-sector dispersion of average
wages
Notes: Parameter values for {ϑs, Ni, dijs, γlis, γ
s′
is , βis, τ
m
s , τi, αs, ψi, ei, Ais} refer to averages across all the pairs with specific values. Standard
deviations are in parenthesis.
40
Table 11: Targeted Moments in the Extended Model vs Data
Moments Data Model
1. Country-specific ratio of average wage to average wages of young cohort 1.51 (0.18) 1.51 (0.18)
2. Country-sector-specific output (relative to US) 0.11 (0.24) 0.11 (0.24)
3. Sector-specific college employment share in the U.S. 0.43 (0.14) 0.41 (0.14)
4. Country-specific college premium 2.06 (0.73) 2.04 (0.72)
5. Country-specific college employment share 0.21 (0.12) 0.19 (0.10)
6. Reduced-form estimate in Section ?? -0.04 -0.04
7. Between-sector dispersion of log average wage in the U.S. 0.24 0.24
Note: When we compare output between the model and the data, we normalize each country’s sectoral output by the U.S.’s
sectoral output in the model and in the data. The first five moments refer to averages across all the pairs with specific values.
Standard deviations are in parenthesis. We compute the between-sector dispersion of log average wage separately for skilled
and unskilled workers using the U.S. ACS 2005, and then take the average of the between-sector dispersion across two types of
workers.
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